The 10 March agreement needs more time

Since the signing of the March 10 agreement between interim president Ahmad al-Sharaa and Mazloum Abdi, commander of the SDF, Syria has one foot forward on a possible political settlement, and the other sunk deep in the mud of the past. When it was announced, the agreement resembled a glimmer of hope, promising the return of the Syrian state in an inclusive and national form, while also offering the Kurds recognition.

As the deadline for the implementation of the agreement approaches, the gap between the parties is wide and continues to grow wider. What is needed is just more time for conditions to mature.

The agreement represented a bold attempt to reconcile the needs of Syrian unity with respect for the sacrifices made during the war years, while also ensuring the Kurds’ entry into the emerging state without foregoing their identity and rights. The eight articles that made up the agreement were carefully balanced, combining a cessation of hostilities, recognition of rights, institutional integration, the reinforcement of state unity, and the return of the displaced. 

The words were good on paper. But they collided with a tough reality: the implementation of each of the eight articles requires a chain of political, security, constitutional, and regional understandings that have yet to materialise.  

In the rounds of negotiations held in Damascus between the government and the Autonomous Administration, progress appeared largely cosmetic. Each side arrived burdened by its own fears. The government doesn’t want power-sharing in Damascus, partly because of Turkish pressure over giving too much away to the Kurds. The Autonomous Administration, meanwhile, fears that “integration” will amount to a disguised return to old centralism. 

As a result, negotiations have devolved into courteous statements devoid of substance.

It is impossible to discuss northeast Syria without discussing Turkey. Ankara has always been a directly involved actor, politically and militarily, and its intervention has been a decisive factor in obstructing the agreement’s implementation. Every step towards integration or internal accommodation has been met with Turkish pushback, underscoring that progress does not rely on the goodwill of Syrian actors alone.

Despite the agreement’s provision for a comprehensive ceasefire, clashes with the SDF continue, most often with factions loyal to Turkey. Implementation has thus become contingent on Ankara’s approval, and it currently rejects any formula that grants Kurds a significant and constitutionally-guaranteed role within the state. 

As the deadline for implementing the agreement almost expires, it is clear that the time originally allotted for its completion was insufficient. The scale of the political, constitutional, and security complexity exceeds what a single year can allow. A Syria that has failed for years to address even one major underlying cause of conflict cannot be expected to settle foundational issues touching on identity, security, and regional influence at such haste. The agreement therefore requires more time.  

It also requires new conditions that ensure genuine commitment from both sides to institutional integration and constitutional reforms, while at the same time curbing the ability of regional powers to derail the talks through threats of military action.

The agreement may not collapse entirely, but without the right framing it may not succeed either. What can be said with confidence is that even if it falters it has opened a door that will not easily be closed: the door to acknowledging that Syria’s future will not be a carbon copy of its past; that the Syrian state, as we once knew it, cannot return to its pre-war form, even if some wish it to do so; and that the Autonomous Administration, whatever the disagreements surrounding it, has become a reality that cannot be sidelined.  

An extension to the agreement seems likely. And with time, the nature of international sponsorship of Syrian actors may evolve. Damascus may yet find it in its interest to move gradually towards a form of decentralisation because centralism itself is no longer viable. And the SDF may find itself compelled to accept gradual integration, not as a concession, but because remaining outside the state is no longer viable.